

# *Rosa Ferrer*

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## **Education**

Ph.D. in Economics, 2009, Vanderbilt University

### Dissertation Committee and References

Professor Andrew Daughety (co-chair), Professor Jennifer Reinganum (co-chair), Professor Tong Li and Professor Paige Skiba.

M.A., Economics, 2005, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

B.Sc., Economics, 2003, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

B.A., Law, 2003, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

## **Academic positions**

Assistant Professor, Dept. of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2009- present

Affiliated Professor, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, 2009- present

## **Research and Teaching Fields**

Primary: Law and Economics, Industrial Organization

Secondary: Microeconometrics, Economics of Crime, Game Theory

## **Research papers**

“The effect of lawyers’ career concerns on litigation,”

“Overworking to win the case: representing cases in court and young lawyers’ hours of work”

“Breaking the law when others do: A model of law enforcement with neighborhood externalities,” *Forthcoming* at the European Economic Review.

“On the justice of decision rules,” with Jose Apestequia and Miguel A. Ballester, *Revise and resubmit*.

## **Teaching Experience**

Vanderbilt University, Teaching Assistant

Law and Economics; 2007

Intermediate Macroeconomics; 2007

Industrial Organization; 2006

Principles of Microeconomics; 2006

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Teaching Assistant

Economics for Engineers; 2005

Introduction to Economics; 2004

Mathematics for Economists; 2004

### **Honors, Grants and Fellowships**

Vanderbilt College of Arts and Science, Summer Research Award, 2008  
NSF selectee to participate in the 3rd Lindau Meeting in Economic Sciences  
Household International Best Research Paper Award 2007, Vanderbilt University  
Kirk Dornbush Research Assistantship for AY 2007-08, Vanderbilt University  
Doctoral Fellowship, Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, 2004-2006  
Doctoral Fellowship, Ramon Areces Foundation, 2003-2004  
Erasmus Scholarship, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Spring 2002

### **Other Research Experience**

Research Assistant for Professors Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum, NSF grant SES-0814312 “Mass Torts and (Rational) Bayesian Optimism,” September 2008 to present  
Visiting Graduate Student, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Jan - June 2006

### **Professional Activities**

#### Referee

International Economic Review  
RAND Journal of Economics  
Economica  
Economics Bulletin

#### Presentations of Research

Annual Conference of the EARIE, Ljubljana, Slovenia, September 2009  
Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, Barcelona, August 2009  
Annual Conference of the Association for Public Economic Theory, Galway, June 2009  
ECORE Summer School on Market Evolution and Public Decision, Brussels, June 2009  
Second European Economic Review Talented Economists Clinic, Florence, May 2009  
Simposio de Economía Española, Zaragoza, December 2008  
Southern Economic Association, Washington D.C., November 2008  
Meeting of the Canadian Law and Economics Association, Toronto, September 2008  
University of Bonn, Law and Economics Workshop, July 2008  
Annual International Industrial Organization Conference, Washington DC, 2008  
Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, New York 2008  
European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Budapest, 2007  
Graduate Student Conference at Washington University in Saint Louis, 2006  
European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Vienna, 2006  
International Social Choice and Welfare Meetings, Istanbul, 2006

### **Professional Memberships**

Econometric Society, European Economic Association, European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, American Law and Economics Association, Association for Public Economic Theory

## Research Papers

### 1. “The effect of lawyers’ career concerns on litigation,” [Job market paper].

This paper studies the effects of lawyers' career concerns on litigation in a model with two lawyers opposing each other in a case. The outcome of the trial depends on the lawyers' talents and choices of effort, and therefore is informative about the lawyers' talents. Career concerns imply that the lawyers' payoff functions are increasing in the market's inference about their talent. As a consequence, they provide an implicit incentive for lawyers to exert higher levels of effort in court, and create strategic interactions between the two. In particular, career concerns create an equilibrium effort trap, which implies larger trial costs and is consistent with empirical findings on lawyers' hours of work. In addition, these results have implications for settlement. First, larger trial costs increase the range for pretrial bargaining. Second, I find that the lawyer with stronger career concerns may end up obtaining a more beneficial settlement agreement.

### 2. “Overworking to win the case: representing cases in court and young lawyers’ hours of work.”

Using survey data from the "After the JD" study, I test whether representing cases in court induces young lawyers to work more hours. Young lawyers appearing in court might have incentives to work more hours because, considering that the trial outcome is an important source of information about lawyers' skills, winning or losing a case might have a considerable impact on their careers. Once controlling for salary, educational background and some other demographic variables, I estimate the average treatment effect between lawyers that are frequently involved in court cases (treatment group) and the rest of lawyers working in law firms (control group). I find that young lawyers who usually appear in court as first or second chair on a case work nearly five hours more per week than other young lawyers also working in law firms. This result also holds when the dependent variable is hours of work minus hours expected to work, which controls for unobservable heterogeneities and addresses possible selection concerns.

### 3. “Breaking the law when others do: A model of law enforcement with neighborhood externalities,” *Forthcoming at the European Economic Review*.

A standard assumption in the economics of law enforcement is that the probability of a violator being punished depends only on the resources devoted to enforcement. However, it is often true that the productivity of enforcement resources decreases with the number of violators. In this paper, an individual who violates the law provides a positive externality for other offenders because the probability of being punished decreases with the number of individuals violating the law. This externality explains the existence of correlation between individuals' decisions to break a law. The model evaluates the implications when determining the socially optimal enforcement expenditure, focusing specifically on the case of neighborhood crime. In particular, using a parametrized functional form, I show that neighborhood externalities will enhance or impede enforcement, depending on the crime rate.

### 4. “On the justice of decision rules,” with J. Apesteguia and M. A. Ballester” *Revise and resubmit*

Which decision rules are the most efficient? Which are the best in terms of maximin, or maximax? We study these questions for the case of a group of individuals faced with a choice from a set of alternatives. First, we show that the set of optimal decision rules is well-defined, particularly simple and well-known: the class of scoring rules. Second, we provide the optimal decision rules for the three different ideals of justice under consideration: utilitarianism (efficiency), maximin, and maximax. We show that plurality, arguably the most widely used voting system, is optimal in terms of maximax, while the best way to achieve maximin is by means of negative voting, and the optimal utilitarian decision rule depends on the culture of the society. We then provide the mapping between cultures and optimal decision rules.